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WRONGFUL CONCEPTION: THE EMERGENCE OF A FULL
RECOVERY RULE
The entire history of the development of tort law shows a continuous ten-
dency to recognize as worthy of protection legal interests which previously
were not protected at all.'
"Wrongful conception" 2 is a form of medical malpractice claim that
arises when a physician's3 negligence, usually involving failed surgical
sterilization procedures,4 leads to the birth of a healthy but unplanned
child. Within the last twenty-five years, courts in thirty-four states and
the District of Columbia have recognized this cause of action;5 only
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (1965).
2. Terminology in the area of birth-related torts is sometimes confusing. The modem trend is
to distinguish three separate causes of action that may arise when a defendant's negligence results in
the birth of a child: "wrongful birth," "wrongful life," and "wrongful conception," also known as
"wrongful pregnancy." Benjamin L. Locklar, Comment, Jackson v. Bumgardner: A Healthy New-
born-A Blessing or a Curse?, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 153, 154-55 (1988). For definitions and
comparisons of these causes of action, see infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
3. In the great majority of wrongful conception cases, the defendant is a physician. Plaintiffs
have also brought actions against hospitals, see, eg., Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370
(Ohio 1989), and pharmacists, see, eg., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
Other possible defendants include manufacturers of contraceptive drugs or devices, laboratory tech-
nicians, and other health care professionals. Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for
the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1311 n.2 (1982).
4. Most wrongful conception cases arise when a female plaintiff has undergone a failed tubal
ligation or a male plaintiff has undergone a failed vasectomy. The plaintiff alleges negligence either
in the performance of the procedure, see, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984) (physi-
cian's failure to cauterize plaintiff's left fallopian tube resulted in an ineffective sterilization), in post-
operative testing, see, eg., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (physician
erroneously advised plaintiff that the results of a post-vasectomy semen test were "negative"), or in
advising plaintiff of the risk of failure, see, eg., C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988) (physician
failed to inform plaintiff that tubal ligation procedure was not "absolute in nature" and that alterna-
tive sterilization procedures existed with different success rates).
The cause of action can also arise in a variety of contexts other than voluntary surgical steriliza-
tion. See, eg., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986) (physician failed to replace
intrauterine device [I.U.D.] and to inform plaintiff of the omission); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d
718 (Ala. 1982) (physician erroneously informed plaintiff he had removed her fallopian tubes during
exploratory abdominal surgery); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (pharma-
cist incorrectly filled prescription for birth control pills with a mild tranquilizer). See David J.
Burke, Note, Wrongful Pregnancy: Child Rearing Damages Deserve Full Judicial Consideration, 8
PACE L. REv. 313, 340-72 (1988) (appendix outlining state-by-state the leading wrongful conception
cases decided through 1987). See generally A.S. Klein, Annotation, Medical Malpractice, and Mea-
sure and Element of Damages, in Connection with Sterilization or Birth Control Procedures, 27
A.L.R.3d 906 (1969 & Supp. 1991); Gregory J. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully
Causing One to be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978 & Supp. 1991).
5. The first case to recognize a wrongful conception claim was Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal.
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Nevada has judicially barred claims for wrongful conception.6
The central issue in wrongful conception cases is whether the plaintiffs
may recover from the tortfeasor the costs of raising the child.7 Most ju-
risdictions apply one of two rules that bar full recovery of child-rearing
costs. Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia hold that child-
rearing costs are not recoverable,8 following the "limited damages" rule.9
Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). See Burke, supra note 4, at 318-19. For a list of the leading cases on
damages decided since 1967, see infra notes 8 and 12.
6. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986) (but case permitted to go to trial on
breach of contract theory).
7. TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE '90S § 8.18, at 425
(1990). Kiely identified this issue as among "the most important long-term developments in the
areas of defenses and damages" that will result in significant change in tort law during the 1990s. Id.
§ 8.1.
8. Following is a list of the leading cases in states which do not permit plaintiffs to recover the
costs of raising the child:
Alabama:
Arkansas:
Delaware:
Florida:
Georgia:
Illinois:
Indiana:
Iowa:
Kansas:
Kentucky:
Maine:
Michigan:
Missouri:
New Hampshire:
New Jersey:
New York:
N. Carolina:
Ohio:
Oklahoma:
Pennsylvania:
Tennessee:
Texas:
Utah:
Virginia:
Washington:
W. Virginia:
Wyoming:
Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982).
Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982).
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), overruled on other grounds by
Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Delaware, 571 A.2d 786 (Del. 1989) (unpublished
opinion; text in Westlaw).
Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1984).
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (111. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984).
Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459 (Kan. 1985).
Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986). This holding is codified at
ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 24, § 2931.2 (West 1990).
Rinard v. Biczak, 441 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. banc 1992).
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982).
P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1985).
Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989).
Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987).
Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982).
Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974).
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).
Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986).
McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984).
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W.Va. 1985).
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
The District of Columbia adopted the "limited damages" rule in Flowers v. District of Columbia,
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Courts applying this rule permit plaintiffs to recover damages directly
associated with pregnancy and birth, 10 but will grant summary judgment
in favor of the defendant as to claims for child-rearing expenses." Six
states follow a "benefits" rule,12 allowing plaintiffs to prove and recover
the costs of raising the child, but requiring the jury13 to reduce the plain-
tiffs' award by the value of the intangible benefits associated with having
a child.14 Despite the apparent judicial consensus that limitations on re-
covery of child-rearing expenses are appropriate, 15 both the "limited
478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984). See generally Burke, supra note 4, at 340-72; Russell G. Donaldson,
Annotation, Recoverability of Cost of Raising Normal, Healthy Child Born as Result of Physician's
Negligence or Breach of Contract or Warranty, 89 A.L.R.4th 632, § 3 (1991).
9. See C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 513 (Utah 1988); Johnson v. University Hosps., 540
N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Ohio 1989).
10. These damages commonly include the mother's medical expenses, damages for pain and
suffering in connection with pregnancy, childbirth, and recovery, and emotional distress stemming
from the unexpected pregnancy; the mother's lost wages; and the husband's loss of his wife's consor-
tium. Plaintiffs may also recover the cost of the failed sterilization and the cost of a second, success-
ful sterilization. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Mass. 1990) (collecting cases and specifying
elements of recovery allowed); Burke, supra note 4, at 320-21 (listing common elements of recovery).
11. See, e.g., Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d 146, 150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (affirming sum-
mary judgment against plaintiffs on claim for child-rearing expenses, pursuant to holding in Mason
v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982), that costs of raising child are not compensable, but
reversing summary judgment on counts seeking damages relating to pregnancy and birth).
12. The following states have adopted the "benefits" rule:
Arizona: University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983).
California: Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
Connecticut: Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982).
Maryland: Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984).
Mass.: Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d I (Mass. 1990).
Minnesota: Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
See generally Donaldson, supra note 8, § 5.
13. Whether a jury will find that the intangible benefits of parenthood outweigh its financial
costs is highly dependent on the facts of each case; a jury could even find the plaintiff entitled to
recover none of the costs of raising the child. See, e.g., Morris v. Frudenfeld, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982).
14. As authority for the "benefits" rule, these courts cite § 920 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1979). For the text of § 920 and criticisms of the use of § 920 in wrongful conception cases,
see infra notes 95, 126-33 and accompanying text.
15. Courts applying the "limited damages" and "benefits" rules agree that child-rearing ex-
penses should not be fully recoverable. They differ only in their approach to limiting recovery. In
the "limited damages" decisions, courts hold as a matter of law that the plaintiffs may not recover
child-rearing costs. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. Courts adopting the "benefits"
rule hold that the issue of whether the plaintiffs have suffered a net detriment is a jury question. In
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 296-97 (Wyo. 1982), Chief Judge Rose noted in a concurring
opinion:
[T]hrough application of the "benefit[s] rule" the courts give recognition to the philosophy
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damages" and "benefits" rules have been subject to criticism in the volu-
minous scholarly literature on wrongful conception 6 and in lively dis-
sents in the cases themselves as distortions of ordinary tort recovery
principles. 17
Many courts have discussed a "full recovery" rule which would permit
plaintiffs to recover child-rearing expenses without offset,"8 but until re-
cently, courts unanimously rejected the "full recovery" rule." However,
that the costs and benefits associated with the introduction of an unplanned child to the
family will vary depending upon the circumstances of the parents.... By recognizing these
considerations, the "benefit[s] rule" encourages and entrusts the trier of fact with the re-
sponsibility of weighing and considering all of the factors associated with the birth of an
unplanned child in a given 'wrongful pregnancy' case.
Id.
16. See, eg., David J. Burke, Wrongful Pregnancy: Child Rearing Damages Deserve Full Judi-
cial Considerations, 8 PACE L. REV. 313 (1988); Robert A. Guttman, Trends in Recognition of Fu-
ture Child Rearing Expenses in Wrongful Conception Actions, 8 J. JuV. L. 178 (1984); Lawrence P.
Hampton, The Continuing Debate Over Recoverability of the Costs of Child-Rearing in "Wrongful
Conception" Cases: Searching for Appropriate Judicial Guidelines, 20 FAM. L.Q. 45 (1986); Donna
K. Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C. L. REV. 759 (1982); Renee M. Ham, Wrongful Conception:
North Carolina's Newest Prenatal Tort Claim-Jackson v. Bumgardner, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1077
(1987); Jeff L. Milstein, Recovery of Child-Rearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motiva-
tional Analysis, 32 EMORY LJ. 1167 (1983); Ada F. Most, By What Measure? The Issue of Damages
for Wrongful Pregnancy, 16 N.C. CENT. L.J. 59 (1986); Lee Ann Nicholson, Damages: Recovery of
Damages in Actions for Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Life, and Wrongful Conception, 23 WASHBURN
LJ. 309 (1984); Sandra G. Sylvia, One More Mouth to Feed: A Look at Physicians' Liability for the
Negligent Performance of Sterilization Operations, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 1069 (1983); Note, Judicial
Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REV.
1311 (1982); Benjamin L. Locklas, Comment, Jackson v. Bumgardner: A Healthy Newborn-A
Blessing or a Curse?, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 153 (1988); Brian McDonough, Note, Wrongful
Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 65 (1981); Nancy L. White, Recent
Decisions, Flowers v. District of Columbia: Another Court Refuses to Settle the Question of Damages
in Wrongful Conception Cases, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1209 (1985).
17. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 617 (N.M. 1991) (stating that the number of
cases adopting the "limited damages" and "benefits" rules "gives a false impression of unanimity"
because "[m]any of these decisions include strong dissents from one or more judges, criticizing the
rationale of the majority and urging the adoption of a different rule").
18. See, e.g., University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Ariz. 1983); Garrison
v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 461 (Kan.
1985); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (N.H. 1982); Johnston v. University Hosps., 540
N.E.2d 1370, 1376 (Ohio 1989); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Tenn. 1987); C.S. v. Nielson,
767 P.2d 504, 510 (Utah 1988); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 291 (Wyo. 1982).
19. In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (111. App. Ct. 1981), the Illinois Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiffs could recover the costs of raising the child without offset. However,
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, adopting the "limited damages" rule in Cockrum v. Baumgart-
ner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S. 846
(1983). See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
Many courts cite the landmark case of Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
as establishing a full recovery rule. See, eg., Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 461 (Kan.
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FULL RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
in 1990, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted the "full recovery"
rule in Marciniak v. Lundborg, ° and the following year the New Mexico
Supreme Court did the same in Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez. 1 In
1992, in Girdley v. Coats,2 the Missouri Supreme Court refused to follow
the trend, reversing the Missouri Court of Appeals' adoption of the "full
recovery" rule. 3
This Note argues that limitations on recovery of child-rearing expenses
in wrongful conception cases stem from the erroneous notion that the
cause of action devalues human life. Part I distinguishes the tort of
wrongful conception from other birth related torts that may raise "sanc-
tity-of-life" issues. Part II enumerates the policy rationales courts have
given for adopting the "limited recovery" and "benefits" rules. Part III
discusses the arguments against limitations on damages, demonstrating
that such limitations violate the principles of tort recovery and fail to
advance the considerations at stake in wrongful conception cases. Part
IV analyzes the recent cases adopting the "full recovery" rule. Part V
concludes that the emergence of a "full recovery" rule in wrongful con-
ception cases signals a mature judicial understanding that invasions of
the individual interest in controlling procreation deserve full
compensation.
I. WRONGFUL CONCEPTION AND OTHER BIRTH RELATED TORTS
Modem cases in the area of birth related torts distinguish three sepa-
rate causes of action when the plaintiff asserts that a tortfeasor has
wrongfully caused the birth of another.24 In "wrongful birth" cases, the
1985); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 742 Crenn. 1987). However, in a subsequent California
Court of Appeals decision, the court adopted the "benefits" rule. Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The California Supreme Court has not settled the issue. See Smith v.
Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 742.
Another case that courts sometimes cite as support for a full recovery rule is Bowman v. Davis,
356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (per curiam). See Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 742-43. However, in
Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989), the Ohio Supreme Court held
that child-rearing expenses were not compensable. The Johnson court distinguished Bowman, stat-
ing that Bowman had not addressed the damages issue in wrongful conception claims. Id.
20. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990). See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
21. 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991). See infra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
22. 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
23. No. 17117, 1991 WL 116734 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1991). See infra notes 165-75 and
accompanying text.
24. Locklar, supra note 2, at 154. Older cases often used the terms "wrongful life" and
"wrongful birth" interchangeably in all birth related tort actions. Id.
1992]
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parents of a child born with a birth defect or genetic disorder file suit
against the physician, alleging post-conception negligence.25 The plain-
tiffs claim that the physician negligently failed to diagnose the condition
in time to allow them to abort the fetus.26 Because the plaintiffs initially
desired a child, the basis of the injury is not the conception of the child
and the resulting pregnancy, but rather the birth of a child who would
otherwise have been aborted.27
Early cases classified all birth related torts in which the plaintiffs were
the parents under the rubric "wrongful birth." However, in Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic,28 the Minnesota Supreme Court coined the term
"wrongful conception" to distinguish torts based on pre-conception neg-
ligence from other birth related torts.29 In "wrongful conception" cases,
the parents of a healthy child (or, sometimes, a child born with anoma-
lies) allege that a physician's negligence resulted in an unwanted preg-
nancy.3" Since the parents did not desire a child, the injury occurs at the
point of conception.31
In contrast with "wrongful birth" and "wrongful conception" cases,
the plaintiff in a "wrongful life" action is not the parents, but instead, the
child himself or the child's representative. In a "wrongful life" suit, a
child born with a birth defect or genetic disorder alleges that "but for" a
physician's negligent failure to alert the parents of the child's condition,
the parents would have aborted the child rather than giving birth.32
Thus, the basic distinctions between "wrongful birth," "wrongful con-
ception," and "wrongful life" are the identity of the plaintiff, whether the
alleged negligence occurred before or after conception, whether the child
was born healthy, and whether the child was planned.33
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Margaret . Mullen, Comment, Wrongful Life: Birth Control Spawns a Tort, 13 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 401, 404 (1980).
28. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
29. See Note, Wrongful Conception, 5 Wm. MrrcHELL L. Ray. 464, 476-80 (1979).
30. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
31. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 175.
32. Locklar, supra note 2, at 154.
33. Only children or their representatives may bring "wrongful life" actions; such actions al-
ways involve children born with birth defects. In contrast, parents may bring either wrongful birth
and wrongful conception actions. Wrongful birth claims always involve children born with birth
defects; actions for wrongful conception most commonly involve healthy children, but may also
involve children born with birth defects. Phillip A. McAfee, The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statu-
tory Prohibition of Postconception Negligence Actions, 14 WM. MiTCHELL L. REV. 701, 711-12 n.53
(1988). The central distinction between actions brought by parents is in the timing of the alleged
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Judicial recognition of each of these three causes of action depends on
the interest the plaintiff asserts. In a wrongful life suit, the plaintiff al-
leges an interest in not being born with birth defects.34 An essential ele-
ment of the wrongful life claim is that the parents would have aborted
the child if they had known of the fetal defects.35 Thus, the plaintiff
urges the court to accept the argument that no life is preferable to life
with impairment, a position that is fraught with grave philosophical diffi-
culties.36 A majority of courts reject wrongful life claims.37 Some juris-
negligence. In wrongful birth cases, the alleged negligence occurs after conception; in wrongful
conception actions, the alleged negligence is pre-conception. This distinction is significant because
allegations of post-conception negligence always implicate the abortion controversy. See infra notes
39-48 and accompanying text. One commentator argues that the distinction between a planned or
unplanned child "lacks contemporary significance and places the focus on the victim's culpability,
rather than the tortfeasor's." McAfee, supra, at 711-12 n.53. However, whether the child was
planned or unplanned is clearly relevant to the damages issue. Parents who initially desired to have
a child were prepared to incur at least the normal costs of child rearing, and thus wrongful birth
plaintiffs should logically recover only the extraordinary expenses of raising an impaired child.
KIELY, supra note 7, § 8.18 at 427.
The development of genetic counseling technologies blurs any neat distinction between "wrongful
birth," "wrongful life," and "wrongful conception" claims. See generally McAfee, supra at 706-08.
If the parents of an impaired child received erroneous advice that they were not at risk of passing
genetic abnormalities to the child, their cause of action would resemble wrongful conception because
the alleged negligence occurred prior to conception; but it would also resemble a wrongful birth
claim because they initially desired a child. A wrongful life claim based on pre-conception negli-
gence would not differ substantially from one based on post-conception negligence, because the
child's impaired existence would be the basis of the claim in either instance. However, a pre-concep-
tion claim would require the child to establish that the tortfeasor owed a duty to an unconceived
child. Wrongful life claims based on pre-conception negligence have generally been more successful
than those based on post-conception negligence. One commentator suggests that this is because
causation is stronger in pre-conception cases. McAfee, supra, at 748-49 n.215.
Additionally, the birth related torts of wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful conception
differ from prenatal injury cases, in which a physician's alleged negligence causes physical injury to a
normal fetus in utero. See generally Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40
A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971 & Supp. 1991).
34. Patrick J. Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, WAsH. U. L.Q.
919, 935 (1979).
35. James Bopp, Jr., et al., The "Rights" and "Wrongs" of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life:
A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REv. 461, 463 (1989).
36. In the leading "wrongful life" case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), a
child with nontreatable impairments sued the physician with whom the mother consulted after con-
ception. The physician was negligent because he failed to detect the impairment, depriving the
mother of the opportunity to abort the abnormal fetus. The court noted that if the physician had not
been negligent, the result would not be a healthy birth, but no birth at all. Thus, the appropriate
comparison for purposes of damage calculation is between life in an impaired state and no life at all.
The Gleitman court concluded that to "weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexis-
tence of life itself" was impossible. Id. at 692. One commentator suggests avoiding the "being or
nothingness" problem in wrongful life actions by compensating the child for the pain and suffering
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dictions hold that damages would be unascertainable, while others hold
that as a matter of law, life is preferable to nonlife.3"
In wrongful birth actions, the plaintiffs assert an interest in the right to
abort an impaired child.39 In 1973, the United States Supreme Court
held in Roe v. Wade I that a state may not completely deny a woman's
right to have an abortion, and created a trimester framework to deter-
mine the scope of permissible state regulations.4 The Roe decision did
not compel recognition of the wrongful birth cause of action because the
Constitution does not require state courts to provide a tort remedy for
private interference with constitutionally protected rights.42 However, in
the wake of Roe, wrongful birth actions gained acceptance in the
courts.43 The Court's recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services I forecast important changes in abortion law that call into ques-
tion the scope of the abortion right that forms the basis of a wrongful
birth claim. The Webster decision clearly demonstrated that Roe does
not prohibit a state from deciding to favor childbirth over abortion or
from implementing that decision in tort law. In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,45 the Supreme Cout upheld Roe's
central holding that a state may not prohibit a woman from terminating
a pregnancy before viability, but struck down Roe's rigid trimester
framework and elevated the state's interest in protecting potential life.46
The Court demoted the woman's interest in the abortion decision from a
fundamental right that cannot be restricted except to serve a "compel-
ling" state interest to an interest that is subject to regulations that do not
the child experiences as a result of its defects, minus the benefits accruing to the child as a result of
its birth. William S. Topham, Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongul Life: Analysis of the Causes of
Action and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 833, 839. However, this
approach may not avoid complex philosophical inquiry because it still requires a calculation of the
benefits of existence.
37. See Bopp, et al., supra note 35, at 462-63.
38. Topham, supra note 36, at 842 n.61.
39. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 2017, 2017 (1987).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
41. Id. at 164-66.
42. Kelley, supra note 34, at 959. See also Bopp, et al., supra note 35, at 472.
43. Bopp, et al., supra note 35, at 467.
44. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
45. Nos. 91-744 and 91-902, 1992 WL 142546 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
46. Casey, 1992 WL 142546, at *27. See also Linda Greenhouse, High Court Affirms Right to
Abortion But Allows Most of Pennsylvania's Limit, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1992, at A1; Kathleen M.
Sullivan, A Victoryfor Roe, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1992, at AI5.
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impose an "undue burden," defined as regulations "whose purpose of
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion before the fetus attains viability."'47 Casey did not address
whether a state may prohibit abortions performed because of fetal im-
pairments; nevertheless, even if such abortions may not be specifically
regulated, a state ban on wrongful birth claims probably would not con-
stitute an undue burden on the abortion right.48 Thus, states may reject
wrongful birth claims without violating any constitutional guarantees.
Underlying the tort of wrongful conception is the interest of parents in
controlling the size of their families,4 9 an interest rooted in common
law5" that has come to enjoy constitutional protection.51 Similar to
wrongful birth cases, constitutional precedent does not compel the courts
to recognize the wrongful conception cause of action.52 However, the
Webster and Casey decisions strengthened the argument that the courts
should provide a remedy for invasions of the interest in contraception.53
If a state has made a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, as
many states have,54 recognition of the tort of wrongful conception and
47. Casey, 1992 WL 142546, at *27.
48. Just as with wrongful conception, a state need not provide a text remedy to private interfer-
ence with a consititional right. See notes 24-75 supra and accompanying text.
49. Note, supra note 29, at 466.
50. Wrongful conception cases generally rest on the invasion of a common law interest, rather
than a constitutional right. Id. at 467 n.19. Early decisions in which the plaintiffs asserted a claim
for damages based on negligently performed sterilizations concluded that voluntary sterilization was
not contrary to public policy, and thus characterized the plaintiffs' interest in controlling procreation
as a common law right. Id. at 467-69 (discussing Christensen v. Thorby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn.
1934) and Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1958)). Both of these cases denied relief, not
because the interest in family planning did not deserve protection, but because of an implied public
policy preventing parents from asserting the birth of an unplanned child as a legal injury. Id. at 469.
The Shaheen court declared that "to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign
to the universal public sentiment of the people." 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45. This reasoning has pre-
vailed, as more recent cases deny full recovery of child-rearing costs in wrongful conception cases.
See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
51. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Griswold court struck down a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive drugs and devices, holding that the statute
invaded the fundamental right of marital privacy in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
53. The Casey court explicitly reaffirmed the vitality of the line of cases beginning with Gris-
wold, stating that "subsequent constitutional developments have neither disturbed, nor do they
threaten to diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to intimate
relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child." Casey, 1992
WL 142546, at *15.
54. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN § 256B.01 I (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1991
Replacement); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Supp. 1991).
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full recovery of proximately caused damages would be consistent with
that value judgment," because all wrongful conception plaintiffs have
declined to abort, but rather have chosen to bear and raise a child whose
conception they initially sought to prevent. Thus, courts which bar the
cause of action or refuse to permit recovery of child-rearing expenses
may "subtly encourage" such plaintiffs to choose abortion. 6
For anti-abortion activists, the claims of wrongful life, wrongful birth,
and wrongful conception not only implicate different interests, they also
raise different moral questions. Anti-abortion activists argue that wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life actions give rise to bioethical problems,
whereas wrongful conception actions do not."7 Wrongful birth and
wrongful life, they argue, imply the moral judgment that life with physi-
cal impairment is not worth living; this "quality of life" standard, they
believe, "is at odds with the concept of the moral equality of all human
beings and the fundamental principles of justice which undergird the eth-
ical and legal protection of life in Western society."5 Further, the idea
that a physically impaired child is better off not being born or that its
family suffers harm from its existence may reinforce existing social preju-
dice against the handicapped. 9 Despite the fact that in every wrongful
life and wrongful birth case the child exists and was not aborted, 6° anti-
abortion activists fear that judicial recognition of these causes of action
would create a legal duty for doctors to perform and for mothers to un-
dergo abortions.61
In light of these concerns, the Americans United for Life Legal De-
fense Fund drafted model legislation prohibiting wrongful life and
wrongful birth actions, but allowing claims for wrongful conception.62 A
variety of anti-abortion groups lobbied on behalf of this legislation in the
55. McAfee, supra note 33, at 733.
56. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ark. 1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
57. Bopp, et al., supra note 35, at 465-66. Bopp is General Counsel of the National Right to
Life Committee. Id. at 461.
58. Id. at 512 (quoting Wilhelm Reich, Life: Quality of Life, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIoTmics 836 (1978)).
59. Id. at 494 (quoting Valentine, When the Law Calls Life Wrong, 8 HUM. LIFE REV. 46, 52
(Summer 1982)).
60. "The reality of the 'wrongful-life' concept is that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due
to the negligence of others." Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
61. Topham, supra note 36, at 857.
62. Note, supra note 39, at 2019 n.9.
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state legislatures; 63 to date, seven states have enacted statutes based on
the model.6" These statutes prohibit any cause of action based on the
claim that "but for" another's negligence, a child would have been
aborted.65 By phrasing the prohibition in terms of abortion, the drafters
of the laws leave intact causes of action based on the claim that but for
another's negligence, a child would not have been conceived; thus, the
prohibitions only bar those birth related tort actions arising from post-
conception negligence.66
Since the enactment of these statutes, defendants in wrongful concep-
tion cases have unsuccessfully argued that the statutes also preclude ac-
tions based on pre-conception negligence. In CS. v. Nielson,67 the
defendant argued that the Utah Wrongful Life Act6" barred a claim
based on the conception of a child after a failed sterilization. 69 The Act
set forth the State's right to life policy, prohibited causes of action based
63. Id. at 2018 n.6.
64. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990); IND. CODE § 34-1-1-11 (Supp. 1991) (barring wrongful
life actions only); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.130 (1986); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (1987 Revision);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
65. See supra note 64.
66. See McAfee, supra note 33, at 703. One commentator vigorously argues that state bans on
wrongful birth actions violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Note, supra
note 39, at 2023-27. Such statutes intrude into the constitutionally protected right to consult with a
physician in connection with the abortion decision in that they "licens[e] doctors to withhold infor-
mation regarding a woman's risk of bearing a child with birth defects." Id. See also Topham, supra
note 36, at 862-63 (arguing that Utah's statutory prohibition of wrongful birth actions "is violative
of the spirit, if not the letter, of Roe v. Wade and related decisions" insofar as it "significantly
encroaches on the parental right to make an informed procreative choice").
The only court to rule on the constitutionality of statutes barring wrongful birth actions held that
the statutes are constitutional. In Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.
1986), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a physician's allegedly negligent prenatal testing did
not involve state action, and that Minnesota Statute § 145.424, barring wrongful life and wrongful
birth actions, violated neither the United States nor the Minnesota Constitution. See Note, supra
note 39, at 2019 (arguing that the Hickman decision was wrong.) But see Bopp, et al., supra note
35, at 472-73 (agreeing with the Hickman decision). Hickman was decided before the Webster and
Casey decisions. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. There is little doubt that these
statutes are constitutional under Casey's "undue burden" standard. See supra notes 45-48 and ac-
companying text. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (holding that statute prohibiting
recipients of federal funds from engaging in abortion counseling and referral do not unconstitution-
ally infringe on the doctor-patient relationship or the woman's right to make informed medical
decisions).
67. 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 to 78-11-25 (1987). For a discussion of the passage of the
Utah Wrongful Life Act, see Topham, supra note 36, at 856-58.
69. Nielson, 767 P.2d at 507-08.
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on the prevention of abortion, and eliminated as a defense in any action
the claim that a person had failed or refused to prevent a live birth.7"
The Utah Supreme Court held that the statute only precluded wrongful
life and wrongful birth actions.71 Terming the instant claim as "wrong-
ful pregnancy" based on deprivation of the decision not to conceive a
child, the court held that the language of the Act did not bar the claim
and that recognition of the cause of action did not contravene the state
policy valuing human life.72
In Hatter v. Landsberg,7a a Pennsylvania court examined the legisla-
tive history of a statute barring wrongful birth and wrongful life ac-
tions.74 The court concluded that the legislature's express intent was to
prohibit causes of action promoting abortions, not to bar wrongful con-
ception claims arising from failed sterilizations. 75 Therefore, the court
held that wrongful conception claims are actionable.76
Wrongful conception thus remains a valid cause of action, even in ju-
70. The full text of the Act is as follows:
78-11-23. Right to Life-State Policy.
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to encourage all
persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age, development,
condition or dependency, including all handicapped persons and all unborn persons.
78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not actionable.
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any
person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a person would not
have been permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted.
78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a defense.
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person shall not be a
defense in any action, and shall not be considered in awarding damages or child support, or
in imposing a penalty, in any action.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 to 78-11-25 (1987).
71. Nielson, 767 P.2d at 508 ("[C]laims made by deformed or impaired children and their par-
ents... for negligent medical treatment or advice which... deprived the parents of the opportunity
of deciding to prevent live birth by choosing to abort a deformed or impaired fetus.").
72. Id. at 508-09. The court also held that the plaintiff could not recover the projected costs of
rearing the child. Id. at 516.
73. 563 A.2d 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
74. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (1988) provides:
(A) Wrongful Birth.-There shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of
any person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once
conceived would not or should not have been born....
(B) Wrongful Life.-There shall be no cause of action on behalf of any person based on a
claim of that person, that, but for an action or omission of the defendant, the person would
not have been conceived or once conceived, would or should have been aborted.
Id.
75. Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d at 150. ("The legislators also specifically state that this
legislation was not intended to bar cases of 'wrongful conception' resulting from negligently per-
formed sterilization.").
76. Id. The court also held that the damages issue was controlled by the Pennsylvania
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/7
FULL RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
risdictions which have sought to disfavor abortion by enacting statutes
curtailing the other birth related tort actions, such as wrongful birth and
wrongful life. Because wrongful conception is a cause of action based on
the negligent invasion of an individual's interest in preventing concep-
tion, it does not raise the abortion issue or implicate "sanctity of life"
concerns. Nevertheless, judicial attitudes that lawsuits for wrongful con-
ception devalue human life have influenced courts to limit recovery of
the expenses of raising the child.
II. THE "LIMITED DAMAGES" AND "BENEFITS" RULES
Despite widespread judicial recognition of the tort of wrongful concep-
tion,77 until recently no jurisdiction permitted victims of medical negli-
gence in connection with surgical sterilization to recover under the same
principle governing damages in other tort actions-that tortfeasors are
responsible for all damages proximately caused by their negligence.7"
Medical negligence in connection with sterilization is the proximate
cause of both the birth of a child, and the expenses associated with rais-
ing her, because the birth of a child is precisely the consequence the par-
ents sought to avoid in undergoing the sterilization procedure.79
Supreme Court's decision in Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982), which held that
child-rearing expenses were not recoverable. Id. at 150-51.
77. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
78. The central principle of tort damages is that "[o]ne injured by the tort of another is entitled
to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused by the
tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1979). "Legal cause" and "proximate cause" are
interchangeable terms for the same inquiry-whether the torfeasor's act is "so closely connected
with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." W. PAGE
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 263-64 (5th ed. 1984).
79. There are many tests of proximate cause. Id., §§ 41-44. Each test seeks to identify conse-
quences for which the defendant should be liable beyond those directly traceable to the precise risk
presented by the defendant's conduct. Thus, under any of the prevailing tests, realization of the real
risk the defendant's conduct presents constitutes proximate cause. Some courts have disallowed
recovery for child-rearing expenses reasoning that the fact of pregnancy, and not the resulting exist-
ence of the child, constitutes the injury. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743, 748
(N.C. 1986). However, a growing number of jurisdictions explicitly recognize that "an uninter-
rupted chain of causation exists between a negligently performed sterilization procedure and the
foreseeable consequences of the conception, pregnancy, and birth of a child." KIELY, supra note 7,
§ 8.18 at 425. The argument that the parents' intercourse breaks the chain of causation between the
defendant's negligence and the conception and birth of the child has been unsuccessful. See Cus-
todio v. Bauer, 50 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) ("It is difficult to conceive how the very
act the consequences of which the operation was designed to forestall, can be considered unforesee-
able."). It is, of course, possible that other intervening or superseding causes could break the chain
of causation. See Note, supra note 29, at 485-87.
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However, the overwhelming majority of courts which have considered
the damages issue in wrongful conception cases limit recovery of child-
rearing expenses,"0 either by precluding them as a matter of law under
the "limited damages" rule,81 or by permitting the jury to reduce the
award by the intangible benefits of parenthood under the "benefits"
rule. 2 Most courts provide a truncated remedy in wrongful conception
cases because they perceive claims for child-rearing expenses as the par-
ents' denial of the value of their child's existence, 3 rather than as a legiti-
mate claim for economic loss. Courts adopting the "limited damages"
and "benefits" rules attempt to vindicate the value of the child by declar-
ing the child to be a "blessing" 84 or a "benefit"8 5 that fully or partially
compensates the parents for their economic losses.
Courts that have adopted the "limited damages" rule deny recovery of
child-rearing expenses by advancing a variety of rationales based on pub-
lic policy.86 Under the "limited damages" approach, courts declare
either that the birth of a healthy child is not a legally compensable in-
jury 7 or that, as a matter of law, the benefits conferred by the birth of
the child outweigh the burdens associated with it.88 A related theory, the
80. One commentator remarked that "this area of the law now seems to contain more rules for
limiting wrongful [conception] damages than it contains wrongful [conception] cases." Note, supra
note 3, at 1312.
81. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
83. Several courts have candidly admitted that they are "loath to adopt a rule, the primary
effect of which is to encourage, indeed reward, the parents' disparagement or outright denial of the
value of their child's life." Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); see also Byrd v. Wesley
Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985); Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 188 (Okla. 1987).
84. The "blessing" concept derives from the early case of Christensen v. Thorby, 255 N.W.
620 (Minn. 1934), which held that a plaintiff who fathered a child after undergoing a vasectomy had
received a "blessing." The court dismissed the case, implying that he had suffered no legally cogni-
zable damage. This idea has carried forward into the more recent cases that recognize the validity of
the plaintiffs' negligence claim, but provide recovery under the "limited damages" formula. See
Topham, supra note 36, at 850-51.
85. The "benefit" concept is associated with cases following the "benefits" rule, which rests on
the idea that the birth of a child is ordinarily, but not always, a benefit to its parents and that the jury
is the proper body to measure the benefit on a case-by-case basis. See Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d
511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) and cases cited in supra note 12.
86. See Burke, supra note 4, at 323.
87. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477
N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1985); Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985); Macomber
v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986); Morris v. Sanchez, 726 P.2d 184, 187-88 (Okla. 1987).
88. See, eg., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 13-14 (Del. 1975); Mason v. Western Pa.
Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982).
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"emotional bastard" hypothesis, posits that the child may one day dis-
cover that its parents sued to recover the expenses of rearing it, causing
emotional harm. 9 Some courts believe that claims for child-rearing ex-
penses not only devalue human life, but undermine the stability of the
family unit.1° The common thread in all of these policy rationales is that
the plaintiffs asserted that the birth of the child was an injury and that
courts should deny this claim out of respect for the sanctity of human
life.9 Any of these rationales could logically extend to deny recovery
altogether; nevertheless, courts employ them only to deny recovery of
child-rearing expenses, while permitting plaintiffs to recover other ele-
ments of damage.92
A minority of jurisdictions permit recovery of child-rearing expenses,
but require the jury to offset the plaintiffs' award by the value of the
intangible benefits conferred by the child.93 One commentator has de-
scribed this "benefits" rule as a balance between compensating the tort
victim and preserving the primary position of the American family.94
The rule derives from section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.95
89. See, eg., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722-23 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 853 (Wash. 1984).
90. See, eg., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. App. 1984); Wilbur
v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).
91. See Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987). The Morris court stated:
The majority of jurisdictions having considered this matter have concluded that, as a mat-
ter of law, the costs of raising the unplanned child may not be recovered in a medical
malpractice action for negligent sterilization .... One thread connects the reasoning com-
mon to all these cases. That thread is the sanctity which must be placed on human life.
Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
Several courts deny recovery, not due to the "sanctity of human life," but rather, because of
suspicions that recovery of child-rearing expenses will represent a windfall to the plaintiffs. This can
arise when: (I) child-rearing damages are too speculative, see, eg., McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d
850, 855 (Wash. 1984) ("We believe that it is impossible to establish with reasonable certainty
whether the birth of a particular healthy, normal child damaged its parents.") (emphasis added); (2)
an award of child-rearing expenses bears no proportion to the physician's culpability, see, e.g., P. v.
Portadin, 432 A.2d 556, 559 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1981) (quoting Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,
219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Wis. 1974) (recovery of child-rearing expenses would "create a new cate-
gory of surrogate parent" because the parents would receive all the benefits of parenthood while the
physician would have to shoulder all the costs)); and (3) awarding child-rearing expenses would
promote fraudulent claims, see, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
For rebuttals to each of these arguments, see Burke, supra note 4, at 330-36.
92. See Burke, supra note 4, at 330-32.
93. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
94. KIELY, supra note 7, § 8.18 at 425.
95. The Restatement provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
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Although section 920 requires that the offset be to the same interest, 96
courts applying the Restatement in the wrongful conception context ar-
gue that a strict interpretation of the rule would result in unjust enrich-
ment.97 In addition, these courts reason that the jury should be able to
consider the fundamental values embedded in the parent-child relation-
ship, as well as the dignity and sanctity of life when calculating a damage
award.98 Courts adopting the "benefits" rule believe that its virtue lies in
its flexibility, because it permits the trier of fact to make a case-by-case
determination of whether the plaintiffs have in fact suffered a loss, based
on such factors as a family's size and income and the parents' age and
marital status. 99
Some courts adopting the "benefits" rule have imposed an additional
limiting factor to the analysis: the parents' motivation in undergoing ster-
ilization. 11 These courts generally classify the parents' interest as either
eugenic, therapeutic, or economic,10 1 and only allow recovery when the
interest is economic.1 "2 While commentators have advocated a "motiva-
tional analysis,"103 it is questionable, however, whether the motivation
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages to the
extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 920 (1979).
96. Id. at cmts. a, b.
97. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (Ariz. 1983).
98. Id. at 1299.
99. Id. at 1300 (citing Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)).
100. See, ag., Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429,436 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1,
5-6 (Mass. 1990); University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Ariz. 1983).
101. Jones, 473 A.2d at 434-36.
102. Id.
103. Jeff L. Milsteen, Comment, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A
Motivational Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167 (1983). Milsteen advocated a "motivational analysis"
that would focus attention away from the "child-as-injury" approach taken by courts adopting the
"limited damages" rule. In his view, courts should inquire into the parents' motivation for undergo-
ing sterilization to determine the specific interest they sought to protect; the court should then award
damages based on whether the child's birth represented an actual damage to those interests. If the
motive is therapeutic, i.e., to safeguard the mother's health, damages would never extend to normal
child-rearing expenses because the plaintiff-parents did not undergo sterilization to save those ex-
penses. Id. at 1191. If the purpose is eugenic, i.e., to prevent the conception of a genetically defec-
tive child, child-rearing expenses would likewise not be recoverable; if the child is actually born
impaired, damages would extend only to the extraordinary expenses associated with raising an im-
paired child. Id. at 1192-94. Only when the parents seek sterilization for "pure[ly] economic" rea-
sons does Milsteen advocate full recovery of child-rearing expenses: "The interest sought to be
protected is a pecuniary one, and parents should be awarded damages for all provable financial
injuries they sustain." Id. at 1194-95. If the parents' motivation for sterilization is "socio-eco-
nomic," i.e., not purely economic but also to avoid burdens on lifestyle or career, the impaired
interests would be more difficult to identify, but recovery would be substantially less than in the case
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limitation comports with the tort damage principle that the tortfeasor is
liable for all damage proximately resulting, not merely the foreseeable
consequences. to4
III. CRITICISMS OF THE "LIMITED DAMAGES"
AND "BENEFITS" RULES
The rationales courts have used to deny or limit recovery of child-
rearing expenses in wrongful conception cases have drawn criticism as
"vague," 105 "result-oriented,"'' "° and "outstandingly unimpressive."107
Cases and scholarly literature on wrongful conception have effectively
rebutted these criticisms.108
The central criticism of the "limited damages" rule is that it miscon-
strues the nature of a lawsuit for wrongful conception. Wrongful con-
ception cases, one dissenter recognized, do not concern whether the
plaintiffs want to keep their child.'°9 In contrast, plaintiffs in these cases
seek compensation for the costs of raising a child they love and want to
keep.110 The injury is not the child itself, nor do the claimed damages
relate to the child's value."I
When properly characterized as suits for economic injury, claims for
child-rearing expenses neither degrade the child nor destabilize the emo-
tional well-being of the family. Rather, denial of these expenses increases
the financial strains on families faced with raising an additional, unex-
pected child." 2 In addition, some commentators argue that recovery
rules which insulate tortfeasors from a portion of the expenses proxi-
mately caused by their negligence could dilute the standard of care in
of "pure economic" motivation. Id. at 1195-96. Critics of a motivational analysis primarily argue
that it would unduly complicate wrongful conception trials. See Note, supra note 29, at 505.
104. Note, supra note 29, at 505.
105. Burke, supra note 4, at 338.
106. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 826 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
107. Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1990).
108. See, eg., McDonough, supra note 16; Philip Braverman, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays
For Bringing Up Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 418 (1978) (arguing against the "limited damages"
rule and in favor of the "benefits" rule); Note, supra note 3; Burke, supra note 4; and Note, supra
note 29 (arguing in favor of a full recovery rule). But see Diedre A. Burgman, Wrongful Birth
Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U. L. RE. 127 (1978) (arguing in
favor of the "no recovery" rule).
109. Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1379 (Ohio 1989) (Brown, J., dissenting).
110. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990).
111. Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (Md. 1984).
112. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 619 (N.M. 1991).
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connection with sterilization procedures and undermine the deterrent
purpose of tort damages.113
To the extent that some courts have precluded recovery of child-rear-
ing expenses because of concern for the child's emotional well-being, crit-
ics of the "emotional bastard" theory' 14 charge that it is simply
implausible that a child would be less likely to discover a lawsuit to re-
cover pregnancy-related costs than one to recover child-rearing ex-
penses. 1 5 These skeptics also charge that it is ridiculous that the child
will feel less of an "emotional bastard" if she learns that a court denied
its parents recovery of child-rearing costs out of concern for her feel-
ings.116 Should the child learn of the lawsuit, the emotional effect is
probably no greater than the effect on a child who otherwise becomes
aware that her birth was an "accident." 1 7 Although some courts have
attempted to control what information reaches the child,' others have
concluded that it is the parents who must weigh the risks to the child's
emotions in deciding whether to bring a lawsuit. 1 9
Commentators have sometimes noted that courts which focus on the
child as the product of the defendant's negligence ignore the importance
of the plaintiffs' interest in family planning and their decision to undergo
113. Several courts have noted that imposing some liability for wrongful conception is essential
to promoting due care in connection with sterilization.
A physician who assumes responsibility for a sterilization procedure at the request of a
patient assumes a professional duty to render appropriate service, including testing and
advice regarding the procedure, exercising the same standard of care applicable to other
- members of the medical profession in the community .... Immunizing physicians from
liability for negligence in this area would be contrary to public policy, and we decline to do
SO.
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 508 (Utah 1988) (quoting Johnston v. Elkins, 736 P.2d 935, 939 (Kan.
1987)). The same court, however, adopted the "limited damages" rule. Id. at 509. A judge who
dissented from the majority's holding on limited recovery stated that "the limited recovery rule
dilutes the liability rule's deterrent effect." Id. at 521 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting).
114. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
115. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1079 n.1 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren, J.,
dissenting).
116. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 724-25 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., concurring
specially).
117. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
118. Some courts have addressed part of their opinions to the child in order to clarify that the
case implied no rejection of the child. See, eg., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242,
245-46 (Wis. 1974); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 14 (Del. 1975). Others have styled the case to
protect the anonymity of the plaintiffs. See, e.g., P. v. Portadin. 432 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. 1981);
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 874 n.1 (W. Va. 1985); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 505 n.2
(Utah 1988).
119. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1291, 1300 (Ariz. 1983).
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sterilization. 121 If the birth of a child is always an unqualified blessing, as
one dissenter in a "limited damages" case noted, attempts to limit family
size are irrational.12 The fact that a child's parents initially sought to
prevent the child's conception reflects their judgment that the potential
benefits of having a child did not outweigh the burdens.1 22 The parents'
judgment should have an estoppel effect-the physician whose aid they
sought in limiting conception should not later be allowed to deny the
importance of that interest 123 or to assert that the unplanned child is
actually a blessing.' 24 In a particularly vehement dissent, Justice Opala
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court argued that in view of the constitutional
dimension of the right to limit procreation, there is more, rather than
less, reason to award full compensation to victims of medical negligence
in the performance of sterilization. 25
Commentators also criticize the courts applying the "benefits" rule for
sidestepping the limitations set forth in section 920 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and for violating the underlying purpose of the rule.
The purpose of section 920 is to prevent unjust enrichment,1 26 not to
allow tortfeasors to force victims to accept a benefit against their will.
127
Thus, section 920 contains two limitations: (1) the "same interest" limi-
tation, and (2) the "equitable" limitation.' 28 When properly applied by a
court, the "same interest" limitation offsets the parents' recovery of
child-rearing expenses only by the pecuniary benefits the parents may
expect from the child; 129 in the usual case, such offset will be minimal. 30
120. See Milsteen, supra note 103, at 1169-70; Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370,
1378-80 (Ohio 1989) (Brown, J., dissenting).
121. Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1079 n.2 (D.C. App. 1984) (Ferren, J.,
dissenting).
122. Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1990).
123. Kelley, supra note 34, at 943. But see Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill.
1983) (presuming from the fact that the parents did not abort the child or place it for adoption that
the intangible benefits of parenthood outweigh the "mere monetary burdens involved" (quoting Pub-
lic Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980))).
124. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974)
(Cadena, J., dissenting) ("The doctor whose negligence brings about such an undesired birth should
not be allowed to say 'I did you a favor' secure in the knowledge that the courts will give to their
claim the effect of an irrebuttable presumption.").
125. Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 191-92 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
126. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f (1979).
128. Note, supra note 3, at 1323-26.
129. The comments following § 920 clearly state that emotional benefits should not offset eco-
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Should the parents seek to recover for the emotional distress of child-
rearing, the emotional benefits received from the child would offset those
amounts. 131 Some courts acknowledge that the "benefits" rule, as ap-
plied in wrongful conception cases, violates the "same interest" limita-
tion, but assert that a stringent reading of the "same interest" limitation
would produce unjust enrichment. 132 However, the fairness of a loose
interpretation of section 920 is questionable, because it opens the door to
allowing the tortfeasor to force a benefit onto the tort victim.
133
Many judges have expressed concern with the courts' reliance on pub-
lic policy to deny recovery of child-rearing expenses. 134 One judge re-
marked that it seemed "strange" that the majority had found a public
policy against recovery of child-rearing costs, given both the state's pol-
icy in favor of family planning and the court's policy of compensating
tort victims. The judge suggested that the "policy" was instead a reflec-
tion of the personal views of individual members of the court. 135
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee criticized courts that pre-
cluded recovery of child-rearing expenses on public policy grounds as
overstepping their authenticity by dictating public policy rather than
law.' 36 The court stated that the four relevant public policies were: (1)
the constitutional value of the interest in controlling family size; (2) the
balance between deterring medical negligence and ensuring that health
nomic damages, nor should economic benefits offset emotional harm. Comment b to § 920 illus-
trates this principle as follows:
Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that
another interest has been benefitted .... Damages to a husband for loss of consortium are
not diminished by the fact that the husband is no longer under the expense of supporting
the wife.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 920 cmt. b (1979).
130. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 n.12 (Minn. 1977).
131. Note, supra note 3, at 1326. As a practical matter, it is unwise to claim emotional distress
damages for rearing a healthy child. Even when the child is abnormal, the trend is to disallow
claims for the parents' emotional distress. Topham, supra note 36, at 854. See generally Gregory G.
Sarno, Annotation, Recoverability of Compensatory Damages for Mental Anguish or Emotional Dis.
tress for Tortiously Causing Another's Birth, 74 A.L.R.4th 798 (1989).
132. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 n.4 (Ariz. 1983).
133. Burke, supra note 4, at 337.
134. See, eg., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 826-27 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 295-96 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., specially concurring); Schork
v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568,
572 (Ark. 1972) (Dudley, J., dissenting); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 746-48 (Tenn. 1987).
135. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 296 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., specially concurring).
136. Smith v. Gore, 728"S.W.2d 738, 746 (Tenn. 1987). ("[M]any of the observations made by
these courts were essentially philosophical discourses on the value of life without clear constitu-
tional, legislative, or common law foundation.").
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care providers continue to make surgical sterilization available; (3) com-
pensation of tort victims; and (4) the State interest in "promoting stable,
self-supporting families."' 37 The court denied recovery of child-rearing
expenses because various statutes in Tennessee impose the responsibility
of supporting children upon their parents. 138
A dissenting judge on the Kentucky Supreme Court summed up the
views of judges skeptical of judicially-created public policy when he as-
serted that courts should allow recovery under traditional tort principles,
reasoning that the Constitution protects the choice not to procreate, and
noting the absence of a clear expression of public policy from the state
legislature. 139
IV. THE "FULL RECOVERY" RULE
Until recently, criticisms of the "limited damages" and "benefits" rules
had little effect on judicial decisions in wrongful conception cases. One
exception is the Illinois Court of Appeals' decision in Cockrum v. Baum-
gartner," which held that the plaintiffs'41 could recover the costs of
raising and educating the unplanned child without offset for the benefits
of parenthood. The court observed that the case was indistinguishable
from an ordinary medical malpractice action, "[e]thical and moral con-
siderations aside."142 In clear and persuasive language, the court refused
to accept the defendants' argument that the public policy of Illinois
deemed the birth of a healthy child a "precious gift, not a compensable
137. Id. at 748.
138. Id. at 750-51. This decision probably did not advance any of the policy goals identified by
the court, particularly the state's interest in promoting stable, self-supporting families. The plaintiff
was a 25 year-old divorced waitress with a ninth grade education. She became pregnant with a fifth
child four months after delivering twins by caesarian section. During their birth, she had undergone
a tubal ligation. She had never earned more than S5,000 per year. Id. at 740. The court noted the
availability of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and explained that as a condition of receiv-
ing such aid, the mother assigns her rights against the father of the child to the state for enforcement
of his child support obligations. Id. at 750. Because the plaintiff was extremely impoverished and
likely to rely on state assistance to raise the child, denial of child-rearing expenses probably shifted
such costs onto the state, rather than placing them on the tortfeasors, who would be in the best
position to prevent future instances of negligence in sterilization.
139. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 864-67 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
140. 425 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
141. Two cases, Cockrum v. Baumgartner and Raja v. Tulsky, were consolidated for purposes of
appeal. Although the Raja case involved post-conception negligence, both presented the issue of
whether child-rearing expenses were recoverable.
142. Cockrum, 425 N.E.2d at 969.
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wrong."'143 The court of appeals determined that parents have a funda-
mental constitutional right to control their reproductivity. A decision
not to have children, as an exercise of that right, did not denigrate the
sanctity of human life. 1"
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, 145 holding that full recovery of
child-rearing expenses undermined the value of life. 14 6 The supreme
court criticized the "full recovery" rule as an abstract and mechanical
application of tort recovery principles unsuitable for the circumstances of
a wrongful conception case.147
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Marciniak v. Lund-
borg,148 made Wisconsin the first jurisdiction to decisively rule that
plaintiffs in wrongful conception cases could recover the costs of raising a
healthy child to the age of majority without offset for the benefits con-
ferred by the child.149 The Wisconsin court held that child-rearing ex-
penses were foreseeable and proximate consequences of a negligently
performed sterilization, and that none of the defendants' public policy
143. Id. at 970. The defendants relied on the decision of another division of the Illinois Court of
Appeals, Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). In Wilczynski, the plaintiff
underwent an unsuccessful therapeutic abortion and sought to recover the costs of raising and edu-
cating the child in addition to the expense of medical and hospital treatment for the child. Id. The
court denied child-rearing expenses, citing the Illinois Abortion Act of 1975. The Act expressed a
right-to-life policy, condemned abortion, and established the intent of the General Assembly to pro-
hibit abortions unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother if the United States Supreme Court
ever modified or reversed its holdings on abortion. Wilczynski, 391 N.E.2d at 483, 487.
144. Cockrum, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
The uniqueness of life is in no way denigrated by a couple's choice not to have a child ....
Regardless of motivation, a couple has the right to determine whether they will have a
child. That right is legally protectible and need not be justified or explained. The allow-
ance of rearing costs is not an aspersion upon the value of the child's life. It is instead a
recognition of the importance of the parents' fundamental right to control their reproduc-
tivity .... [WMe are not persuaded that public policy considerations can properly be used to
deny recovery to the parents of an unplanned child of the full measure of all damages
proximately caused by a physician's negligence.
Id.
The court also rejected the "benefits" rule, commenting that courts should not use § 920 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) to offset the financial costs of parenthood by its emotional
rewards, because "these rewards are emotional in nature and, great though they may be, do nothing
whatever to benefit the plaintiff's injured financial interest." Id. (citation omitted).
145. 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S.
846 (1983).
146. Id. at 389 ("In a proper hierarchy of values, the benefit of life should not be outweighed by
the expense of supporting it.").
147. Id. at 390.
148. 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
149. Id. at 245.
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considerations justified departing from the well-settled principle that
tortfeasors are responsible in damages for such consequences.1 50  The
court perceived that the plaintiffs had filed the action to recover "the
costs of raising the child, not to rid themselves of an unwanted child,"
and that they were attempting to enhance the child's life rather than to
disparage it.15 1
In Marciniak, the court also declined to apply the benefit rule of sec-
tion 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, noting scholarly criticism
that the offset of economic damages by the value of emotional damages
conferred by the child violates the "same interest" limitation. 52 Provid-
ing its strongest and most original contribution to the cases discussing
the benefits rule in wrongful conception actions, the court concluded that
application of the benefits rule is inequitable.1 51
The following year, the Supreme Court of New Mexico adopted the
"full recovery" rule in Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez. i"4 In Men-
dez, the defendants' position was similar to the arguments advanced by
the defendants in Marciniak: for public policy reasons, the court should
carve out an exception to the principle that defendants in medical mal-
practice actions must indemnify plaintiffs for the proximate conse-
quences of their negligence by denying recovery of child-rearing
150. The defendants argued that:
1. Child-rearing expenses are too speculative.
2. Allowing plaintiffs to recover these costs would be out of proportion to the culpability
of the physician.
3. Awarding child-rearing expenses would render the child an "emotional bastard."
4. The effect of recovery would be to reward the parents for disparaging the value of
their child's life, thus debasing the sanctity of life.
5. Recovery would shift the responsibility of parenting to the physician.
6. Allowing child-rearing costs would "enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point."
Id. at 245-47.
151. Id. at 246.
152. Id. at 248-49.
153. The parents made a decision not to have a child. It was precisely to avoid that "bene-
fit" that the parents went to the physician in the first place. Any "benefits" that were
conferred on them as a result of having a new child in their lives were not asked for and
were sought to be avoided .... [I]t hardly seems equitable to not only force this benefit on
them but to tell them that they must pay for it as well.
Id. at 249.
154. 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991). The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' opinion, which it reproduced in an appendix, but wrote a separate opinion on the
question of the legal interests invaded when a sterilization is negligently performed and the measure
of damages flowing from these invasions. See infra note 160.
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expenses."' In declining to adopt the defendants' theories, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals went a step further than the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Marciniak. The court reasoned that not only were the
various rationales for denial of recovery of child-rearing expenses insuffi-
cient to justify departing from ordinary tort principles, but they were
unsound as a matter of law and public policy. 56 Denial of recovery in
the name of the "sanctity of human life" and "a concern for family"
achieves a result which undermines these values.1"7 Limitations on re-
covery could increase the financial strains that lead to divorce, causing
the entire family to suffer. 58 The court also identified legal and policy
flaws in the "benefits" rule. 59 New Mexico law disallows recovery for
negligent damage to the intangible emotional benefits of family life, such
as the parents' loss of the child's consortium; it would hence be illogical
to permit defendants to reduce their liability by proving the existence of
such emotional benefits." From a policy standpoint, the court found
the benefits rule unpalatable, because weighing the benefits and burdens
of raising children at a trial encourages parents to denigrate their chil-
dren and engages the jury in "distasteful moral determination." '161
The New Mexico court also refused to engage in the "motivational
analysis" adopted by some courts applying the "benefits" rule, 62 which
would have required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that economic factors
motivated their decision to seek sterilization in order to recover child-
rearing expenses. Specifically, the court noted that a person's motivation
for seeking sterilization is not conclusive as to whether an economic in-
155. Id. at 616.
156. Id. at 618.
157. Id. at 619. The court stated:
Our philosophical respect for human life should not be allowed to obscure the fact that
children need to be fed, clothed, housed, educated, and provided with medical care and
other necessities.... We do not understand why a proper respect for human life would
require us to reach a result that is, at best, callously indifferent to the needs of these parents
and their children.
Id. at 619.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 619-20. The court noted that the "benefit" deduction violates the "same interest"
limitation of § 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
160. Id. at 620.
161. Id. Because of this policy concern, the court not only held that the parents' recovery of
child-rearing expenses may not be reduced by the value of the emotional benefits of parenthood, but
also that the parents could not recover at all for the emotional and psychological burdens of child-
rearing; thus, the court limited recovery for emotional pain and suffering to that associated with
pregnancy and birth. Id.
162. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:887
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/7
1992] FULL RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION 911
terest is injured when the sterilization fails, and on a practical level, the
motivation limitation would be difficult for a jury to apply and would
encourage parents to reformulate their actual intent "after-the-fact."
163
Affirming the New Mexico Court of Appeals' adoption of the "full recov-
ery" rule, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a strong stance in
favor of the view that plaintiffs in wrongful conception cases assert inter-
ests that are worthy of full legal protection. 1"
Shortly after the Mendez decision, in Girdley v. Coats,165 the Missouri
Court of Appeals adopted the "full recovery" rule for reasons similar to
those outlined in Marciniak and Mendez.161 In contrast to Wisconsin
and New Mexico, Missouri has an explicit pro-life policy 67 and statuto-
rily prohibits "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life" actions. 168 The court
found, however, that the existence of these statutes did not preclude ac-
tions for wrongful conception.1 69 In addition to these statutes, defend-
ants relied on the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v.
163. Mendez, 805 P.2d at 612.
164. The court stated that the district court, in holding that the Mendezes could not recover
child-rearing costs, "was declaring, in effect, that their interests in financial security and in limiting
the size of their family were not worthy of legal protection." Id. at 611. The New Mexico Supreme
Court essentially adopted all of the court of appeals' conclusions in its opinion reversing the district
court, but disagreed with its definition of the term "injury." The supreme court defined "injury" as
"the invasion of any legally protected interest of another," and identified two separate interests in-
vaded when a physician is negligent in connection with a failed sterilization procedure-the parents'
interest in the economic stability of their family, and their interest in limiting family size. Id. at 609-
10. The court concluded that the invasion of a party's economic interests in wrongful conception
cases is as foreseeable and should be as compensable as financial loss occurring in other tort contexts,
such as products liability and wrongful interference with business relations. Id. at 611. The court
expressed uncertainty about whether the measure of damages flowing from the invasion of the par-
ents' interest in limiting family size was different from or exceeded damages for economic injury;
apparently, the court concluded that the damages consisted primarily of emotional distress damages.
The court agreed that the court of appeals drew a sensible line by limiting emotional distress dam-
ages to those flowing from pregnancy and birth. Id. at 613. See supra note 161.
165. No. 17117, 1991 WL 116734 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1991).
166. Id. at *1.
167. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986). The Missouri statute provides that "[t]he life of each
human being begins at conception" and that "the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights,
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state." Id. The
Supreme Court refused to invalidate this statute in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 506 (1989).
168. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1986) prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action
based on the claim that that person or any other person would have been aborted. For a discussion
of wrongful birth/life statutes and similar cases in which courts have held that they do not bar
wrongful conception actions, see supra notes 62-75.
169. Girdley, 1991 WL 116734 at *2.
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Harmon.7 ° In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged the
state's interest in the sanctity of life.1 71 The Girdley court was not con-
vinced that the state's pro-life and sanctity-of-life policies were relevant,
but commented that they actually cut in favor of allowing recovery. De-
nial of recovery would result in an economic incentive to abort the un-
planned child. 172
Missouri's adherence to the "full recovery" rule, adopted in Girdley,
was short-lived. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, adopting the
"limited damages" rule. 173 The court found persuasive the public policy
rationales articulated by a majority of courts for precluding recovery of
child-rearing expenses, including those which barred relief based on
"sanctity-of-life" grounds.174 A judge who dissented on the damages is-
sue argued that recovery of child-rearing expenses would not undermine
the sanctity of life; he advocated the adoption of the "benefits" rule.175
V. CONCLUSION
The Girdley case exemplifies the debate in wrongful conception cases.
The weight of authority supports the "limited damages" rule, which
holds that recovery of child-rearing expenses contravenes state public
policies valuing human life. 1 76 Recently, the "full recovery" rule has
gained some acceptance in the courts, 177 drawing its strength from com-
mentators' and dissenting judges' arguments that the majority view mis-
apprehends the nature of the tort of wrongful conception. 178 The
"benefits" rule remains an intermediate, minority position that purports
to permit jury consideration of both the tort victims' need for compensa-
170. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), aff'd, Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 488 U.S.
555 (1990).
171. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 419. The court defined the interest in the sanctity of life
as "the principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation without regard to its quality." Id.
172. Girdley, 1991 WL 116734, at *4.
173. Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992) (en bane).
174. The court cited Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985) (birth of healthy
child not legally compensable harm); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982) (recovery of
child-rearing expenses "meddles with the concept of life and the stability of the family unit" and
would render child an "emotional bastard"); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (II1.
1983) (respect for life at heart of legal system). In addition, the court concluded that child-rearing
damages were improper because they were speculative. Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 297-98.
175. Id. at 299-302 (Turnage, Special J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. See supra notes 12, 86-90 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 140-64 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:887
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/7
1992] FULL RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
tion and the value of the child's life. 7 9
The limitations most courts impose on recovery of child-rearing ex-
penses in wrongful conception cases derive from the central concern that
full recovery of these expenses would somehow devalue human life, and
that by precluding them or permitting their reduction by the value of the
child's life, the court upholds the sanctity of life.' 80 Judicial manipula-
tion of tort recovery principles to reach intermediate positions between
outright denial of the plaintiffs' cause of action and full recovery reflects
the courts' desire for balance between competing principles18 and their
search for fair results1 82 in cases that appear to be about "unwanted"
children.'83 Denial or limitation of recovery of child-rearing expenses is
inequitable to wrongful conception plaintiffs and to the child in question
179. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. One limitation courts have universally re-
jected is the avoidable consequences rule of § 918 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979),
which provides that "one injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any
harm he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort," and which would require the plaintiffs
in wrongful conception cases to mitigate their damages by aborting the child or placing it up for
adoption. Most courts perceive that § 918 requires the plaintiffs only to take reasonable steps in
mitigating of damages and find both abortion and adoption unreasonable. Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1081-82 (D.C. App. 1984) (Ferren, J., dissenting). One court stated,
"[w]e do not consider it reasonable to expect parents to essentially choose between the child and the
cause of action." Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Wis. 1990). Other courts have
remarked that under the principle that the tortfeasor takes the injured party as he finds him, a
defendant cannot complain if the plaintiff is the type of person who would be unwilling to abort a
child or give it up for adoption. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). Some
states have enacted statutes prohibiting the failure or refusal of a party to undergo abortion to be a
defense in any action or to be considered in awarding damages. See, eg., Morris v. Frudenfeld, 185
Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6, which bars wrongful life
actions brought by a child against his or her parents and prohibits the "failure or refusal of a parent
to prevent the live birth of his or her child" from being a defense or being considered in awarding
damages in any action).
180. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
181. Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989). The Ohio Supreme Cout
remarked!
[T]his has been one of the most difficult cases we have been called upon to decide ....
Our occupational duty continuously requires us to balance rights and responsibilities of
persons regardless of their color, sex, position or station in life. We accomplish this balanc-
ing in this case while recognizing that our decision will be something less than universally
accepted.
Id. at 1377. The court went on to choose the "limited damages" rule. Id. at 1378.
182. "The courts' search for compromise or intermediate positions in wrongful birth cases is
remarkable in the light of virtually unanimous commentary that supports across-the-board recogni-
tion of the cause of action under 'traditional' negligence theories. The pull of an almost-forgotten
and vaguely articulated notion of corrective justice remains strong." Kelley, supra note 34, at 963.
183. See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) ("This child is not
to be thought of as unwanted or unloved, but as unplanned.").
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because it leaves victims of negligently performed sterilization with one
more mouth to feed at their own expense. Less than full compensation
also defeats the compensatory purpose of tort law, which aims to place
tort victims in a financial position equivalent to their position prior to the
tort.
1 84
Fortunately, the birth of a healthy child is ordinarily "an occasion for
celebration rather than for litigation." '185 However, litigation may be ap-
propriate if the parents can prove the child was conceived after a negli-
gently performed sterilization. In recognition of the fact that such
lawsuits do not imply rejection of the child, but rather seek compensation
to provide for the child's needs, courts should abandon the "limited dam-
ages" and "benefits" rules and give full compensation in wrongful con-
ception cases.
Jennifer Mee
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 cmt. a (1979).
185. Johnson v. University Hosps., 540 N.E. 2d 1370 (Ohio 1989).
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